How ‘who someone is’ and ‘what they did’ influences gossiping about them

To understand, predict, and help correct each other’s actions we need to maintain accurate, up-to-date knowledge of people, and communication is a critical means by which we gather and disseminate this information. Yet the conditions under which we communication social information remain unclear. Testing hypotheses generated from our theoretical framework, we examined when and why social information is disseminated about an absent third party: i.e., gossiped. Gossip scenarios presented to participants (e.g., “Person-X cheated on their exam”) were based on three key factors: (1) target (ingroup, outgroup, or celebrity), (2) valence (positive or negative), and (3) content. We then asked them (a) whether they would spread the information, and (b) to rate it according to subjective valence, ordinariness, interest level, and emotion. For ratings, the scenarios participants chose to gossip were considered to have higher valence (whether positive or negative), to be rarer, more interesting, and more emotionally evocative; thus showing that the paradigm was meaningful to subjects. Indeed, for target, valence, and content, a repeated-measures ANOVA found significant effects for each factor independently, as well as their interactions. The results supported our hypotheses: e.g., for target, more gossiping about celebrities and ingroup members (over strangers); for valence, more about negative events overall, and yet for ingroup members, more positive gossiping; for content, more about moral topics, with yet all domains of social content communicated depending on the situation—context matters, influencing needs. The findings suggest that social knowledge sharing (i.e., gossip) involves sophisticated calculations that require our highest sociocognitive abilities, and provide specific hypotheses for future examination of neural mechanisms.

Results of the commonness scale for positive and negative gossip: from -3 (very rare) to 0 (neither rare nor common) to 3 (very common). (E) & (F) Results of the interest level scale for positive and negative gossip: from -3 (very boring) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (very interesting). (G) & (H) Results of the subjective valence scale for positive and negative gossip: from -3 (very negative/wrong/bad) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (very positive/right/good).

More positive gossiping or less negative gossiping for ingroup targets
Here we examine the three-way interaction (Content x Valence x Target) results in more detail, focusing on potential evidence for whether skewing positive for ingroup targets results from more positive gossiping or less negative gossiping (i.e., elevated positivity or avoided negativity). There was more positive gossiping for respect (authority), competition (positive) competition, and socialoriented (altruism) compared to both celebrities and outgroup (Fig S4I, K Whereas for care/harm and fair/cheating, negative gossiping about ingroup targets was significantly less than that for both celebrities and outgroup targets for harm scenarios (Fig S4B), and significantly less than celebrities and closer to outgroup spreading rates for cheating (Fig S4D). In fact, an examination of all such differences across content domains suggests potential dampening of negative gossiping for ingroup targets with harm, degradation (as well as dampening of sanctity), subversion, and possibly cheating and negative competition (Figs S4B,D,E,F,J & L). This lowering of negative ingroup gossiping suggests that these content topics (i.e., with negative valence) were being avoided.

Negativity-avoidance effect for ingroup targets
Here we address the questions of why certain topics were avoided, and why there was a general negativity-avoidance effect for ingroup targets (Fig 9). Less negativity with ingroup targets might generally be suspected, but this effect is potentially problematic with respect to social checks and balances. Are ingroup members generally permitted to commit harm and cheat the system, for example? We consider four possibilities of why certain topics were avoided, and why there was a general negativity-avoidance effect for ingroup targets.
First, perhaps people would indeed prefer to 'punish' the target individual (to correct their behavior) or protect others (by updating beliefs of possible receivers), however, the possibility of detrimental repercussions may be too high, including harm to the target person and/or the gossiper him/herself (e.g., with respect to reputation and relationships with others) [see 6,47]. We suspect that this factor may play a significant role in the findings.
Second, people may actually not wish to punish those in the ingroup via gossiping and social reputation. This could be due to having other means to police the ingroup: e.g., direct interaction with the target person, using positive versus negative means of correcting behavior. This possibility also seems quite likely to play an important role. Although others have found that direct punishment may be less effective than social reputation manipulation [20], the relative merits of direct vs. indirect punishment and communication likely depend on specific circumstances, and thus would be ripe for computational modeling to specify the circumstances.
Third, people may be generally less sensitive about certain matters such as hierarchy and rankings among friendsi.e., ingroup members may be considered generally of equal status.
Indeed, our participants may consider themselves relatively lower in status (especially being students of 20-32, mean 23.8, years of age). This relatively lower and similar ranking may allow some license to the target individual for borderline behaviors, such as perhaps more selfishness and cheating if these are construed as not too egregious. We wouldn't expect this possibility to entirely explain the results, however, given that such problem behaviors even from one's ingroup would generally be expected to concern people. And fourth, there is likely greater empathy for ingroup members (due to, e.g., more frequent interactions, closer sense of similarities, etc.), and thus a stronger awareness of the effects the gossiping may have on the target (e.g., knowing more clearly that you are making fun of, embarrassing, and/or potentially harming the target's reputation). We again, however, would not expect this possibility to entirely explain the results.

Negative gossiping about celebrities and relationship to status
We next provide a closer examination of the possible reasons underlying the heightened negative gossiping about celebrities. Negative gossiping may derive from a desire to (i) punish the target (to correct their behavior), (ii) protect receivers (by notifying them of aberrant behavior), (iii) manage the social hierarchy via raising one's own and perhaps the receiver's relative status by lowering that of the celebrity (at least within the gossiper's social reach), or (iv) perhaps due simply to intrigue, if such negative scenarios prove especially interesting (i.e., being beyond typical expectations).
Heightened negative gossiping suggests either an even stronger desire for one or more of possibilities (i-iv) or simply the fact that there may be lower risk of negative repercussions to the gossiper (when gossiping about celebrities or outgroup strangers). The lower risk of negative ramifications does seem likely to be a significant factor driving more negative gossiping of celebrities; however, because the lower risk would seem comparable or even less for outgroup targets, and yet gossiping in general is lower about them, possible backlash does not appear to be the only driving factor (Table 1).
For possibility (iv), intrigue, first, in participant ratings of interest level, we did not find a significant difference of negative valence being gossiped more than positive; and in fact, we found the opposite, though negative were more emotionally evocative (see Participant Ratings in main text). Nonetheless, intrigue with respect to garnering interest by being out-of-the norm should also occur for ingroup targets too, so the higher degree with celebrities does not seem to be driven largely by general interest, though further research to tease apart and clarify these effects is warranted.
In fact, possibilities (i)-(iii) (punish, protect, manage hierarchy) all appear to relate to status.
Regarding possibility (i), punishment of target, it would suggest that the greater desire to punish celebrity targets would stem from their higher profile and status, either due to holding those above you to higher standards to justify the inequality or lowering their higher status when possible. With respect to specifically attempting to punish them with gossip, although there may be some sense of this, especially with the possible reach of social media, it nonetheless seems less likely to be much of a significant factor, with celebrities representing more of a one-way interaction. However, although punishment via negative gossiping may not actually affect the target celebrity (due to lack of complete bi-directional interaction), the action of spreading gossip itself may relieve a certain desire of a person (i.e., a gossiper) seeking justice. That is, taking an action of punishment via negative gossiping, regardless of the actual punishment and its consequences, may provide some level of satisfaction (and thus motivate people to instigate gossip). Furthermore, by spreading negative gossip about a celebrity, a gossiper can convey a message to the general population that the targeted behavior is not socially acceptable and thus needed to be held accountable.
For possibility (ii), protection, given that celebrities likely influence those who are interested in them (e.g., as role models), it in turn seems likely that one would wish to notify others when evidence suggests that people's views of the celebrity should be updated based on particularly negative actions undertaken by them (correcting false beliefs). Protection, then, seems likely to be an important component. Related to possibilities (i) and (ii), possibility (iii), social hierarchy management within one's social range, also appears to be a viable possibility if the gossiper hopes to raise his/her own and perhaps the receivers' status as well by lowering that of the celebrity, at least among those within the gossiper's purview, which of course would be among those expected to be most relevant to the gossiper.

Overall effects of status
Indeed, a closer examination of the content domains further suggests that status played an important role in the potential gossiper's decision of whether to spread the news about them. For higher-status celebrities, harm, cheating, loyalty, subversion, and negative competition were particularly important (along with degradation as discussed separately) (Figs 9C & E, Fig 12). These content topics suggest that a show of loyalty and humility at higher status warrants interest (perhaps 'warms peoples' hearts'), whereas trying to beat others in harmful or underhanded ways, or otherwise cheating the system is especially bothersome for celebrity targets, presumably because they represent higher status people (and thus apparently less so for those at lower status levelsi.e., ingroup and outgroup).
Moreover, the greater interest in fairness (over cheating) and altruism (over selfishness) for both ingroup and outgroup targets suggests that such fair and selfless acts are especially impressive when conducted by those of lesser status and means (Figs 10 & 11). Put differently, people may believe that celebrities (as representatives of our society) need to be altruistic and selfless; therefore, altruistic/selfless information about celebrities is considered to be less worthy of spreading. Whereas, altruistic/selfless behavior of ingroup and outgroup targets (who have similar or possibly lower status compared to the gossiper) impresses people (i.e., possible gossipers) more than the same type of information about celebrities, and people consider such information (i.e., altruistic behaviors of ingroup and outgroup members) worthwhile to spread. At the same time, selfish behavior of ingroup and outgroup people are relatively less spread. This finding suggests that such acts may be more tolerated in those with less means and status.
Finally, the higher gossiping rate for authority and positive competition with ingroup targets (compared to the other target groups; Figs 9I & K) suggests that these topics are more relevant and interesting among relatively lower (compared to celebrities) and more equal status ingroup members, with positive competition suggesting scenarios of ambition or achievement resonate more with those striving to improve their status and perhaps especially with friends whose achievements may benefit the entire ingroup.